Being followers of the religion of Islam & Being devout Muslims, Why are we fighting Each other?



When ISLAM boasts itself to be a religion of peace and prosperity; why are we fighting between ourselves and killing each other in the most ruthless manner? Why are we allowing Western Crusaders on hidden agendas and on varies pretexts to kill our fellow Muslims with our own Money and stupid politically motivated “Instant Fatwa’s”? As we all are aware, by definition Islam means “Peace acquired In Submission to will of Almighty Allah” and a Muslim means by definition “One who submits to Allah” and “Muslims are one brotherhood”!!  Are we adhering to this fact?



Why are we being Anti-Islam & Anti-Muslim while ironically pointing the finger at the Kaafir and claiming them to be Anti-Muslim? This curse of killing fellow Muslims & its repercussions all started by a group of people referred to as KHAWARIJ (The outcasts) they were also known historically as the Shurat, literally meaning "the buyers" and understood within the context of Islamic scripture and philosophy to mean "those who have traded the mortal life (aldunya) for the other life [with God] (alakhera). However they referred to themselves as ahl al-'adl wal istiqama people of justice and uprightness". They’re actually an ancient Arab speaking secret Jewish cult of Najd who had been living in Arabia for tens of generations prior to Islam. While deceitfully converting to Islam for material, economical & social benefits with security given in Islam, they pretended outwardly to being devout Muslims, ie. Praying 5 times in Jamath, fasting the month of Ramadan, Sunnah Salah’s, etc,etc, and on the outset you would never imagine that these Godly looking pious “Muslim” people are actually a Cancer unto Muslims. These Khawarij initiated a campaign against true Muslims from which the Muslim’s would never recover.



These Kharijites were the first sect to appear in the history of Islam and later splitting up into more than 20 different sub-sects. They mingled with the Ahlel Sunnah Wal Jammah, Killed the Caliphs (Khalifas) Ali (ral) and instrumental in the Murder of Uthman (ral), They made Muslims fight with Muslims, the 1st Battle of Islam between the forces of Ali (Ral) and Ummul Moomineen Aysha (ral) was a great Anti-Muslim achievement of the Khawarij so was the wars between Ali (ral) & Muawiyah (ral). The 2nd & the greatest division among Muslims, the split as SUNNI Muslim & SHIA Muslim also occurred as a master plan of the Khawarij who devised the plan to split the Muslims and added fuel to fire.



The Khawarij belonged primarily to the tribes of Banu Hanifah and Banu Tamim of Najd numbering around 12.000 to 15.000 tested Warriors who originally fought against Holy Prophet Mohhamed(sal) and successive Caliphs (Khalifas)for the cause of Musaylima al-Kadhab, the Liar & pretender to prophethood the ancestor of Modern Day Saudi Ruling Family, the Ibn Sauds and the forefathers of Sheikh Mohammed Ibn Abdul Wahhab Al-Najdi the founder of Wahabism (Salafism & Tawheedsm).



Hadees 1- Bani Tamim :

Some people of Bani Tamim came to the Prophet and he said (to them), “O Bani Tamim! Rejoice with glad tidings.” They said, “You have given us glad tidings, now give us something.” On hearing that the color of his face changed then the people of Yemen came to him and he said, “O people of Yemen! Accept the good tidings, as Bani Tamim has refused them.” The Yemenites said, “We accept them.” — Narrated Imran bin Husain



Hadees 2- Bani Tamim :



Allah’s Messenger (Allah bless him and give him peace) was one day reviewing the horses, in the company of Uyayna ibn Hisn ibn Badr al-Fazari. Uyayna remarked: “The best of men are those who bear their swords on their shoulders, and carry their lances in the woven stocks of their horses, wearing cloaks, and are the people of the Najd.” But Allah’s Messenger (Allah bless him and give him peace) replied: “You lie! Rather, the best of men are the men of the Yemen. Faith is a Yemeni, the Yemen of [the tribes of] Lakhm and Judham and Amila. [...] Hadramawt is better than the tribe of Harith; one tribe is better than another; another is worse [...] My Lord commanded me to curse Quraysh, and I cursed them, but he then commanded me to bless them twice, and I did so [...] Aslam and Ghifar, and their associates of Juhaina, are better than Asad and Tamim and Ghatafan and Hawazin, in the sight of Allah on the Day of Rising. [...] The most numerous tribe in the Garden shall be [the Yemeni tribes of] Madhhij and Ma’kul.’ -– Ahmad ibn Hanbal and al-Tabarani, by sound narrators. Cited in Ali ibn Abu Bakr al-Haythami, Majma‘ al-zawa’id wa manba‘ al-fawa’id [Cairo, 1352], X, 43).



The village that Bani Tamim (tribe) occupied was known as al-Uyayna. The borough, though overshadowed by the larger town of Huraimila, was destined to be the source of a revolution that would not only reshape the Middle-East but also Muslim’s lives.



They were late converts, who when they came at last into Prophet Muhammad’s presence, insisted on debating with him. Appalled by their boasts of supremacy amongst Arab tribes, Prophet Muhammad elected Hassan ibn Thabit to reprimand them. This he did by composing a humiliating ode that belittled them. Later, of course, Bani Tamim played a key role in the birth of the Kharijites; a cult that regarded ordinary Muslims as hypocrites and apostates who could be killed with impunity.

By the 15th century, al-Uyayna fell into the hands of the Muammar family, who enjoyed a rather quirky reputation for longevity. Wadi Hanifa, the river that nourished al-Uyayna oasis, was also home to a number of tribes that lay like strung pearls along its banks. Nearby was al-Jubayla, whose glittering limestone hills had witnessed the fateful showdown between Khalid al-Walid, the brilliant Muslim general, and Musaylima al-Kadhab, the pretender to prophethood. The battle of Yamama had ended badly for Musaylima, who was unceremoniously acclaimed as a liar and a false prophet.

The most impressive feature of Najdi nomadism is its relative instability as compared with other tribal systems in the area. In North Yemen, for example, Yemeni tribes managed to preserve their structure over the same territory from pre-Islamic times until the present. Similarly, tribes in the Hijaz have managed to maintain their genealogical continuity over many centuries. This phenomenon is not replicated in Najd, where tribal turnover was both high and fickle. Constant immigration from the south and southwestern areas and migration out of Najd into the Fertile Crescent created a complex environment of fission and fusion among Bedouins. Prophet Muhammad’s frequent warnings about Najdi tribes proved far-reaching.

The Wahabis only publicize Hadees which favors them and leave the rest blank; Why? They have printed Million of Hadees Books interchanging the word NAJD with IRAQ and freely distributed them among pilgrims & Wahabi jamath; are they feeling bad that NAJD & Bani Tamim lost its blessings? Trying to make remedies? Which would mean that Shaithan Sheikh Al-Najdi Mohammed Ibn Al-Wahab is the same person Holy prophet (sal) described as HORN OF SHAITHAN! Wahabis are trying a cover-up! Maybe they failed miserably as we have all found-out their SHIRK by the grace of Almighty Allah!



The Holy Prophet (sal) prophesized maybe about Wahabism as:



“They recite the Quran and consider it in their favor but it is against them.



They transpose the Quranic verses meant to refer to unbelievers and make them refer to believers. What I fear most in my ummah is a man who interprets verses out of context.

They will pass through Islam as an arrow passed through its quarry.”



The Modern Day Khawarij; Wahabis, The followers of Sheikh Al-Najdi Mohammed Ibn Abdul Wahhab.



Mohammed Ibn Abdul Wahab Al-Najdi.



It was into this desolation that a man named Muhammad ibn Abdul Wahhab Al Najdi was born in 1703. His father was Abdul Wahhab ibn Sulaiman, a renowned qadi (judge) in al-Uyayna. He also had a brother, Sulayman ibn Abdul Wahhab. Abdul Wahhab ibn Sulaiman saw to it that both his sons received grounding in the fundamentals of religion.



From a very young age, though, Muhammad ibn Abdul Wahhab must have promulgated radical opinions. His father and brother, respected scholars, detected heresy and warned others not to follow him. Sulayman wrote a book refuting his brother’s ideas, entitled Al-Sawaiq al-Ilahia fi al-Ra’d ala al-Wahabia, or Divine Lightning Bolts on the Teachings of Wahhab. The book’s title is misleading. Its pages are inundated instead with gentle and sincere invitations for his brother to repent.



“My brother asks: ‘A hadith sharif says: “Of all that will befall you, shirk is what I fear most.” Is not this a detail of the fact that a part of this Ummah will be engaged in shirk?’

“I say: It is inferred by many other hadiths that this hadith refers to shirku-l-asghar. There are similar ahadith, narrated by Shaddad Ibn ‘Aws, Abu Hurayrah and Mahmud Ibn Labid (may Allah be pleased with all of them), according to which the Prophet (sall-Allahu ‘alayhi wa sallam) feared that shirku-l-asghar would be committed by his Ummah. It has exactly happened as it was foretold in the hadith, and many Muslims are guilty of shirku-l-asghar. But you, in your ignorance, confuse shirku-l-asghar with shirku-l-akbar, and the tragic consequence of this mistake of yours is that you regard as ‘unbelievers’ those Muslims that do not accept to call other Muslims unbelievers.”



Muhammad ibn Abdul Wahhab remained unmoved. He was wholly convinced that he was on the path of righteousness. After performing the hajj in Mecca, Muhammad ibn Abdul Wahhab resumed his education in Medina under the tutelage of such luminaries as Muhammad ibn Sulaiman al-Kurdi and Muhammad Hayat al-Sindhi. Both shaykhs (teachers) professed deep unease over his ideas. Nonplussed, Muhammad ibn Abdul Wahhab returned to al-Uyayna. Youthful zeal, however, soon propelled him to try his hand at exploration. Trade and business, which had been the Prophet Muhammad’s early occupation, seemed especially alluring. He left the oasis and traced a circuitous route that took him to Basra, Iraq, Iran and Damascus.



While there had always been a Shia presence in Mecca and Medina, Muhammad ibn Abdul Wahhab was to have his first real taste of Shia rituals when he reached Iran somewhere between 1725-26. Unsympathetic to the context of the Shia’s intensity, he was appalled by what he saw and later condemned as ‘deviations’ and ‘innovations’. The thrashing that the Shia administered on themselves during Ashura especially, must have shaken him. He roundly denounced the practices, and fled when a mob pursued him.


He arrived in the venerable city of Damascus, where abandoned Crusader forts built on lush, green hills still overlooked Arab cities. Certain Turkish sources say that the impressionable young man had met with a British spy named Hemper. Hemper, so the story goes, had been implanted by the British government to sow discord in the Muslim world. He successfully managed to impregnate Muhammad ibn Abdul Wahhab with revolutionary ideas. Aside from the fact that the British had tried this in India with the Bahais and Ahmedies, there is little else going for this hypothesis.



While in Damascus, Muhammad ibn Abdul Wahhab was greatly impressed by ideas from the Hanbali School of Thought, as filtered through the 13th century scholar, Ibn Taimiyya. The latter, while a towering Hanbalite of his day, eschewed traditional Islam’s attachment to the Four Schools of Thought, and claimed the mantle of mujtahid, which granted him the right to make independent decisions. Thereafter, under the Mamluk Sultan’s patronage, Ibn Taimiyya declared the Mongol ruler of Baghdad, Ghazan Khan, an apostate and agitated for a rebellion against the Mongol empire. His efforts earned the almost unanimous condemnation of the ulema (religious scholars). He was imprisoned where he died embittered by his failure.



Admirers of Ibn Taimiyya assert that he had been a victim of tyranny, but there is good reason to believe that it was his theological stance that had set traditional Sunni scholars against him. Ibn Battuta, the famous Moroccan globetrotter, for example, sets the record straight:



“When I came to Damascus there was a man called ibn Taimiyya speaking about religious science, but there was something strange in his mind… Once he was doing kutbat aljuma’a and he said yanzilou rabbuna ila assam’a adunya, then he went down two steps on the minbar and he said kanuzuli hatha (like my descending-comparing him to Allah). The people of Damascus jumped on him and wanted to kill him”.



Yet, unlike Muhammad ibn Abdul Wahhab, Ibn Taimiyya was, in the words of Hamid Algar (Wahabism, A Critical Essay):



“…a far more rigorous and careful thinker and an infinitely more prolific scholar.”



Muhammad ibn Abdul Wahhab next traveled to Medina, a natural stop to refine his interest in Hanbali jurisprudence. It was here also that Muhammad ibn Abdul Wahhab cultivated a passion for books on heretics such as Musaylima al-Kadhab, Sajah al-Aswad al-An’si and Tulaiha al-Assadi.

The proximity of Musaylima’s demise to his own hometown could hardly have escaped his notice. More remarkable still was that Musaylima had come from Bani Hanifa, whose remnants continued a brigand’s existence in the ramshackle outpost of al-Dirriya. Knowledge of al-Dirriya’s lineage would later prove invaluable.

Again, according to some commentators, Muhammad ibn Abdul Wahhab’s Medinite teachers voiced concerns about him:

“He will be misguided, and he will misguide those for whom Allah willed the misguidance.”



Muhammad ibn Abdul Wahhab returned to the Najd in 1727 with a band of African slaves as bodyguards. Settling in Huraimila, which was his father’s new residence, Muhammad ibn Abdul Wahhab quickly started preaching against what he saw as ‘innovations’. He dismissed practices such as visiting the graves of the Prophet Muhammad’s close companions as shirik, or polytheism. This is a label that the Quran applies on disbelievers rather than Muslims, so the accusations must have stung. Later, religious scholars who inherited Muhammad ibn Abdul Wahhab’s message would solidify this perception by spitefully redefining the practice of visiting the graves of honored predecessors as grave worship, though it was far from that.

It was around this time (1736), in the relative safety and comfort of his hometown, that he commenced work on the only literary output of his lifetime, entitled Kitab al-Tawhid, or Book on Monotheism. This reactionary magnum opus produced no new insights, only an annotated reprint of ahadith that had been carefully selected to uphold his ideas. The title is provocative, to say the least, for it suggests that one of Islam’s most-cherished dogma, monotheism, had been abandoned by the Muslim community. The charge isn’t as superficial as it seems. A society without tawhid, or monotheism, is a throwback to the time of jahiliya, the age of ignorance which was characterized by disbelief and debauchery. Muhammad ibn Abdul Wahhab’s ideas on the Muslim ummah, or community, were beginning to evolve.



For obvious reasons, the majority of traditional scholars forbid the labeling of any Muslim environment, post-revelation, as jahiliya . Such conservatism is justified in the wake of Syed Qutb’s imitation of Muhammad ibn Abdul Wahhab’s apocalyptic theme in 20th century Egypt. Qutb considered present-day Muslim governments as apostates and hence, valid targets for jihad. In itself, revolution and rebellion went against the grain of traditional Islam.



While his father was alive, Muhammad ibn Abdul Wahhab’s activities were severely curtailed. Abdul Wahhab ibn Sulaiman, after all, was a respected authority on religion, and together with his elder son, Sulayman ibn Abdul Wahhab, had openly and concisely chastised Muhammad ibn Abdul Wahhab. The latter was astute enough not to provoke further repudiation of his teachings. When his father finally passed away in 1740, Muhammad ibn Abdul Wahhab embarked on a campaign of vociferous preaching. His belligerence angered Huraimila’s residents. At Sulayman’s persuasion, the town evicted his brother Muhammad ibn Abdul Wahhab.



He fled to his family’s holdings in al-Uyayna. There, his preaching attracted some of his younger relatives. It must be noted that Muhammad ibn Abdul Wahhab had only just returned from a long journey; in the eyes of al-Uyayna’s impressionable youth, he represented a worldly-wise figure who was everything that the stuffy old elders weren’t. Muhammad ibn Abdul Wahhab cultivated and used this aura effectively, railing against the ‘aberrant’ practices he had witnessed in his travels. The Shia, especially, became his favorite scapegoat. Among other things, he condemned the smoking of tobacco and declared trees to be religiously objectionable. An appreciation of their beauty, according to him, could lead to apostasy.



The governor and qadi of al-Uyayna, Uthman ibn Muammar, was initially sympathetic to Muhammad ibn Abdul Wahhab’s preaching,. To cement his links with the oasis and prevent another Hurailima-like scandal from happening here, Muhammad ibn Abdul Wahhab married Uthman’s paternal aunt, al-Jauhara. This was the first in a series of political marriages he would make to seal whatever tenuous alliances could be solicited in the Najd. In his lifetime, he married a total of 20 wives (taking care not to exceed 4 at a time, of course) who furnished him with 18 children.

Uthman ibn Muammar’s indifference, however, came to be sorely tested when Muhammad ibn Abdul Wahhab dragged a woman accused of adultery out into a public square and stoned her to death. Some report that he had, in fact, used a heavy boulder to crush her head. The action triggered widespread fury.



Non-Muslims would profess puzzlement at the villagers’ reaction. Does Islam, like Judaism, not condemn all adulterers to death by stoning?



The perception is true, but there is a caveat. Umar ibn Khattab, one of Prophet Muhammad’s close companions and a Rightly-Guided Caliph, is said to have caught a couple engaging in adulterous sex. The Quranic punishment for such behavior was indeed death by stoning, but Ali, another companion, reminded Umar that no fewer than four witnesses are required to certify guilt for such an accusation, and that if he acted without such testimony, he himself would sin. Umar abided by Ali’s advice and pardoned the couple. It must be noted here that although Umar- whose very shadow the devil was said to run away from- had witnessed the act, he had no authority to suspend Quranic laws.



Muhammad ibn Abdul Wahhab’s behavior was made worse by the fact that he was not recognized as al-Uyayna’s qadi, which was Uthman’s position. At best, the woman’s death was a product of vigilante justice, which flies completely in the face of Islam. In his book, the “The Eternal Message of Muhammad”, the late Abdul Rahman Azzam stated that an ulema “should be of mature age and a man of wisdom, enjoy popular support and be a person who draws on the…counsel of the natural leaders. But if he disobeys the commands of God and disregards the interests of the people, he will be repudiated.”



Hurailima had already repudiated him. History would repeat itself again. In 1744, under intense pressure from the ruler of al-Hasa, al-Uyayna expelled Muhammad ibn Abdul Wahhab. In the Najd’s context, being cast out was not an act of mercy, but a delayed death sentence. Set aside only for severe crimes, it entailed the critical loss of a tribe’s patronage and protection. It made him one of the non-asil, or outcasts with whom it was shameful to marry and befriend. After two expulsions, Muhammad ibn Abdul Wahhab was painfully aware of the danger. There was hope in the south, though, and it was toward this direction that he went.



A New Friend in Bani Hanifa
His well-exercised instincts led him along the bank of Wadi Hanifa, past al-Jubayla’s limestone caves and finally into a small outpost called al-Dirriya, which was governed by Muhammad ibn Saud. Al-Dirriya was a familiar name. It was populated by a people who proudly claimed to be the last vestiges of Bani Hanifa. From his studies in Medina, Muhammad ibn Abdul Wahhab knew that he was trespassing in the land of a tribe whose loins had produced one of Islam’s most malignant enemies, Musaylima.



The desert at that time consisted of two social components, namely the Hadar, or settled communities, and the Bedouins, or nomadic tribes. A striking feature of Hadari society was its total failure to evolve any reliable mechanism for effective rule and orderly succession. In most cases, dominance was fought over by several families, sometimes from disparate genealogical backgrounds. Succession was often effected through murder. This device reared its ugly head nearly a century later, when in the bitter war for power over Saudi holdings, Imam Turki was murdered by his nephew, who was in turn killed by Turki’s son, Faysal al-Saud.



In writings about Saudi Arabia, the kingdom is typically identified with the Bedouin and the ennobling tribal ethic that is supposed to suffuse the state, at least at its inception. This opinion is difficult to sustain for the state had been an exclusively Hadari effort with profound anti-tribal and anti-Bedouin tendencies. There is no greater evidence of this than the well-documented atrocities that the Saudi Ikhwan, who were inheritors of Muhammad ibn Abdul Wahhab’s flagellant message, inflicted on nomadic tribes decades later.



This dogmatism stemmed from Muhammad ibn Abdul Wahhab’s own contempt for the Bedouin. He had attempted to kick-start his pogrom by enlisting Huraimila and al-Uyayna, both Hadari communities. That had ended in dismal failure, and he fled to al-Dirriya, another Hadari place.



Muhammad ibn Abdul Wahhab’s teachings found fertile ground in al-Dirriya, both in terms of the Saud clan’s political opportunism and its theological heritage. Thus, Muhammad ibn Abdul Wahhab’s campaign to purify the faith was met with enthusiasm. He destroyed a tree that was particularly beloved by the Sufis, and prevented people from visiting caves which was believed to hold baraka in al-Jubayla. Ancient domes that had been constructed above tombs of the Prophet Muhammad’s companions and family were demolished, the sites covered over. By and large, his teachings were accepted, but not without friction. In a famous story, Muhammad ibn Abdul Wahhab had demanded that all women shave their heads, but an indignant woman stood up and challenged:



“Hair is the precious ornament of a female as is the beard for a male. Is it apt to leave human beings deprived of their ornaments bestowed upon them by Allahu ta’ala?”



The comical quality of the story disguises an important moral. This was not the first time that Muhammad ibn Abdul Wahhab had re-interpreted Islamic law. His non-response to the outraged woman is testimony to his methodology, which in the end, was not based on what traditional scholars call ‘ijma’, or consensus of the scholars. To do otherwise would be to go against one the Quran’s most powerful yet ignored verses:



“There is no compulsion in religion. Truth is distinct from error.”



Traditional Islamic scholarship is well-acquainted with the dangers of coalescing religious authority on a single individual. Without the check and balance of ijma, which Muhammad ibn Abdul Wahhab regarded as destructive and tainted by subjectivity, rulings have a habit of leaning toward extremism. Ijma upholds the prophetic assurance- “My ummah will not unite upon error.”- and chains Muslims to the Prophet Muhammad’s (sal) warning- “O you people, beware of being extreme…for that which destroyed the people before you was none other than extremism in the religion.”



The Saud clan saw in Muhammad ibn Abdul Wahhab’s message an opportunity to cloak their ambitions in religion. This aspiration for Najdi domination was eagerly sealed, first by marriage between Saud women and the preacher, and then by the formal declaration of a proto-Saudi state in 1746. Using al-Dirriya as its base, dakwah (evangelism) was initially conducted peacefully, but as soon as it was clear that ibn Saud’s ideology of religiously-justified dominion was being met with maddening amusement, quickly degenerated into a brawl.



The theme of ‘tawhid’, or the apparent loss of it, was the ideological pretext that the Saud-Wahhab alliance exploited to attack otherwise Muslim towns. Muhammad ibn Abdul Wahhab insisted, for example, that his followers call themselves al-muwahhidun, or monotheists. The path he laid out was hence clear. The rest of the Muslim ummah were al-mushrikun, or polytheists and therefore licit targets for persecution, embargo, property-confiscation and outright raids; all of these were conveniently stitched into the tapestry of jihad. As Muhammad ibn Abdul Wahhab’s kitab al-tawhid starkly puts it,



“The disbelieving polytheistand Muslims of Cities who were not embracing  Muhammad ibn Abdul Wahhab has only two choices: (i) To embrace Islam of Muwahhidun introduced by Mohammed Ibn Al-Wahhab or (ii) to be fought/War.”



Purity through the sword
This militant-cum-religious doctrine was crystallized in an essay Muhammad ibn Abdul Wahhab wrote for Muhammad ibn Saud. Entitled “The Clarification of Unclarity Concerning the Creator of Heaven and Earth”, the newly-appointed Shaykh al-Islam spelled out for his emir that all present-day Muslims were disbelievers and had been so for the last six hundred years; the tenure of Ottoman rule. It was this accusation that prompted Muhammad Ibn Sulayman Effendi, a prominent scholar of that time to retort:



“It is more correct to call you, a single person, kafir, than calling millions of Muslims kuffar.”

In a process that would last almost half a century, however, the Saud-Wahhab alliance slowly defeated their opponents, both ideologically and militarily.

Muhammad ibn Abdul Wahhab was certain that the religious authorities in the two holy cities would come round to his point of view. Made confident by the backing of a zealous emir in Muhammad ibn Saud, he dispatched thirty wakil, or emissaries to Mecca to request for permission to perform the pilgrimage. These wakil had a more important goal, however, and that was to summon the Meccan ulema to support Muhammad ibn Abdul Wahhab’s vision. Grimly, the judges of the four official schools of Sunni Islam listened to the wakils’ arguments, and in the end, pronounced a verdict of rejection. They accused Muhammad ibn Abdul Wahhab of being a deviant and forbade his followers from performing the annual hajj. The Chief Mufti, Sayyid Ahmad Zayni Dahlan as-Shafi’i, was incensed enough to denounce Muhammad ibn Abdul Wahhab’s ideas in a book entitled al-Futuhatu-al-Islamiyyah.



“To deceive the ulemas in Mecca and Medina, those people sent emissaries in al-Haramayn, but these missionaries were not able to answer questions asked by Sunni scholars. It became evident that they were ignorant bid’ah (innovation) holders. Muftis of the four madhhabs (schools of thought) wrote a fatwa that declared them kuffars, and this document was distributed in the whole Jazirah. The Amir of Mecca, Sharif Mas’ud Ibn Sa’id, ordered that the followers of Muhammad ibn Abdul Wahhab should be imprisoned. Some of them fled to Dariyyah and informed their leader of what was happening.”



This incident, among others, was one of the reasons that the Saud-Wahhab alliance desired control over the two holy cities. It seemed particularly criminal that Muhammad ibn Abdul Wahhab’s followers were barred while the Shia, whom he regarded as the worst of apostates, were allowed to walk Mecca’s streets freely. This, some commentators assert, was sufficient grounds to initiate hostilities against Mecca and Medina, ruled then by Ottoman Caliphate.

The logic is unnecessarily convoluted, given that the traditional ulema considered Muhammad ibn Abdul Wahhab as much a deviant as he considered the ummah-at-large to be in grave error. The ideological and physical embargo that the traditional ulema imposed on Muhammad ibn Abdul Wahhab’s followers find comfortable resonance with the aggressive action that both Prophet Muhammad (sal) and his companions took against heretics.

Meanwhile, the changes wrought on Bedouin society by the Saud-Wahhab alliance were drastic and violent. The nomads were re-indoctrinated in Muhammad ibn Abdul Wahhab’s interpretation of faith principles, and ritual observances forced down their throats. Ibn Bishr, Muhammad ibn Abdul Wahhab’s official biographer, proudly describes the Saud clan’s success in curbing Bedouin hegemony. His diagnosis of the Bedouin problem is typical of the Hadari view, in which he reiterates that the only way to deal with nomads was through the “sword”. In other words, compulsion.

Their campaigns enraged the rest of the Arab world, who saw in them a blatant and deadly denial of Quranic principles. Except for a few shameful bouts in history, Islam had never been spread at the point of the sword.

Other towns and tribes were attacked, their mosques and religious architecture demolished to make way for Muhammad ibn Abdul Wahhab’s “pure” religion, which he painstakingly anchored to the so-called Salaf, or Pious Predecessors. As a news report on the succession of the new King Abdullah puts it:



“Mohammad bin Abdul Wahhab…set about propagating by the sword a return to pure Islam.”

The only tribal ethic that the Saud-Wahhab alliance aspired to was the need for expansion, both to protect itself from other tribes who deplored hegemony, and also to sustain its growing size. But the ethic is less a tribal trait than it is a primitive idea of society. Once set in motion, the virus-like behavior can never stop without destroying itself. Saudi expansion was due more to Muhammad ibn Saud’s recognition of this desert law of survival than to any divine intervention.

“It was either kill or be killed”.

In 1750, an invigorated Saud-Wahhab alliance arrived at al-Uyayna to punish Uthman ibn Muammar for allegedly conspiring with al-Hasa. The irony was not lost on Muhammad ibn Abdul Wahhab, who must have seen in the return a just revenge on those who had precipitated his early disgraces. To Muhammad ibn Saud, however, it was another piece of land to be added to the tally. Unsurprisingly, Uthman was killed and al-Uyayna fell into al-Dirriya’s control. By then, Sulayman ibn Abdul Wahhab must have felt vindicated for his opposition to his brother. Gathering what people he could muster, he led a revolt in Huraimila. This came to naught when Muhammad ibn Saud’s son Abdul Aziz promptly invaded Huraimala with 820 men. Sulayman fled to Sudair. Ten years later, the Saud-Wahhab alliance entered al-Hasa in triumph.

But the Bedouin, who hated tyranny, particularly the one imposed by the Saud-Wahhab hegemony, were motivated enough to launch a rebellion in 1764. In Narjam, they killed 500 of Abdul Aziz’s men and captured 200. The numbers were shocking, a testimony to the power of Bedouin hatred for their recent subjugation. Muhammad ibn Abdul Wahhab, fearing that his adopted clan would be demoralized, quickly negotiated the prisoners’ release during an armistice.

In about this time, Sulayman ibn Abdul Wahhab and his family were captured and delivered to al-Dirriya, where the former ulema was given strict orders not to preach.

Muhammad ibn Saud died a year later and was succeeded by Abdul Aziz, but it would be another ten years before the Saud-Wahhab alliance consolidated their rule in Riyadh, which would henceforth become the capital of the new kingdom. By this time, more than 5000 people had been killed by a war that had been skillfully portrayed as a climatic showdown between muwahhidun and mushrikun. Muhammad ibn Abdul Wahhab’s adopted clan had gone beyond his wildest dreams, grabbing sizable territory, property and goods, and implementing teachings he had first tried, unsuccessfully, to impose on his birthplace. Ummah arabiyya, so to speak, stood on the brink of a glorious future.

Meanwhile, the rest of the Muslim world watched and waited as the crumbling Ottoman empire collected its still-considerable resources to deal with what they deemed was a rebellion to their rule. Muslim scholars who had not been subjugated continued to criticize and refute Muhammad ibn Abdul Wahhab. They saw in him a re-awakening of the ancient cult of the Kharijites, and based their opinion on an authentic hadith that said:

“They recite the Quran and consider it in their favor but it is against them.
They transpose the Quranic verses meant to refer to unbelievers and make them refer to believers.
What I fear most in my ummah is a man who interprets verses out of context.
They will pass through Islam as an arrow passed through its quarry.”

By 1787, Muhammad ibn Abdul Wahhab felt confident enough to declare himself the leader of a worldwide ummah. This was his most direct challenge to the Ottoman Empire. In 1791, the Saud clan seemed poised to overwhelm Mecca and Medina when Abdul Aziz routed Meccan loyalists, Shammar and Mutair, and true to his family tradition made off with 100,000 sheep and goats and thousands of camels. The battle for Islam’s two holiest cities was gaining momentum.

Muhammad ibn Abdul Wahhab did not live to see his adopted clan overcome Mecca and Medina. In 1792, he died, almost a decade shy of being a centenarian. His acumen for survival had made possible the dawn of a new age in which the Saud clan would attain to power and begin the arduous task of finishing, this time in a global scale, what they had started out to do with the Bedouin. Muhammad ibn Abdul Wahhab dedicated almost his entire adult life to imposing, not unity, which he saw as dangerous and unstable, but uniformity.

Unbeknownst to the Saud-Wahhab alliance, the Ottomans would send one of her most gifted generals, Muhammad Ali Pasha, into the Arabian Desert. There, he would break the rebellion and bring the Saudi clan to heel. But this lay in the future, beyond the lifetime of Muhammad ibn Abdul Wahhab.



Wahabism? What’s that?



So what does the Wahhabi teaching consist of? It is impossible to answer this question without an excursus into religious history. Moreover, because the Wahhabi expansion is at the same time well-protected and controversial, with explanations ranging from statements that there is no Wahhabism at all to claims that Wahhabism is merely true Islam.



What Is Wahhabism?

The word Wahhabism most often denotes religious and political extremism related to Islam. In its narrowest and most precise sense Wahhabism is a teaching that was formulated in the 18th century by Arabic religious “reformer” Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab. This teaching later became and still remains an official ideology of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Wahhabis are either supporters of the ideas, constituting the teaching of Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab,.



Why Do Wahhabis Not Want to Be Called Wahhabis?

And yet, followers of Wahhabi principles abstain from relating the word Wahhabism to the religious teaching of Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab, as well as to the official doctrine of the modern Saudi Arabia and to the ideology of movements and groups that accept and disseminate Wahhabi ideas and implement Wahhabi principles throughout the world.



The main reason why Wahhabis don't want to be called Wahhabis is that otherwise they would implicitly acknowledge the accusations that many Muslims bring against them. These are claims that Wahhabis are Islamic heretics (mubtadi'ah), or people who follow a specific religious teaching that was developed by a particular man (Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab) at a particular time (18th century), a teaching that hadn't existed before in this form. The Arabic word heresy (bid'ah) is derived from bada'ah (to introduce something new) and means a condemned and rejected innovation.



That's why Wahhabis don't call themselves Wahhabis but rather refer to themselves as just Muslims (Muslimun), monotheists (Mowahhidoon) or Salafi, "followers of the pious forefathers" (Salafiyyun).



Is It Admissible in Islamic tradition to Call Wahhabis Wahhabis?

According to Islamic tradition, particular branches of Islam that existed in the past or exist at present (schools of jurisprudence, branches of theological thought, Sufi Tariqat orders, sects, etc.) can be named after their founders, regardless of what theological, religious and juridical views those branches convey. There are numerous examples. The eponym of the Hanbali school of jurisprudence is Ahmad ibn Hanbal; of the Qadiri Sufi Tariqat, Abd al-Qadir al-Jilani; of the Asharis theological school, Abu'l-Hasan al-Ashari, etc. So there is nothing disparaging or depreciating in the word Wahhabi itself.



Members of the Saudi clergy also call followers of Ibn Abd al-Wahhab, including themselves, Wahhabis (Wahhabiyyun). When asked if it is admissible to refer to past and present followers of Ibn Abd al-Wahhab as Wahhabis, Saudi Arabia's Religious Affairs Minister Abdallah at-Turki said, "It is really a great honor for Sheikh Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and its ulama, when one who acts according to the Scripture and Sunnah and exhorts to [follow] them is characterized as one who follows the practice and path that Sheikh Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab kept and called to and that imams of the House of Saud upheld" (Al-Muslimun, November 7, 1997).

However ornate the language is, one can see that it is admissible to call Wahhabis as Wahhabis. Or consider a fatwa of the late Saudi mufti Sheikh Abd al-Aziz bin Baz, who didn't hesitate to use the word Wahhabis: "Wahhabis are not heretics; they are those who follow the path of the pious forefathers" (Al-Muslimun, January 17, 1997). Note that this fatwa is the mufti's answer to the claims of Muslims that Wahhabis disseminate condemned innovations, i.e. heretic views.



Wahhabism as Wahhabis See It


So much has been written about Wahhabis and so much controversial material exists that it's high time to come to know how Wahhabis themselves understand Wahhabi teaching, considering that they continually strive to propagate their ideas among readers. It is worth noting that the Wahhabi books published are among the millions that have been distributed in Arabic countries, the Middle East, Southeast Asia, South Europe, Western Europe, Latin America, North America, including the Russia and The United States.

Let us consider a number of Wahhabi texts, including the books and booklets in Sri Lanka distributed on the territory of Sri Lanka and among Sri Lankans in Saudi Arabia (for example, during the hajj) by Saudi authorities and public institutions. This will help us, first, to find out how these sources set out Wahhabi teaching and, second, to check on the accuracy of the widespread explanation of Wahhabi ideas.

Wahhabism is the result of the selection and adaptation of the Quran and Sunni postulates to Wahhabi views and ideas. Here is what a Wahhabi author writes about a typically Wahhabi approach to the Quran and the Sunnah. "In this book I gave answers to all questions relating to postulates of Islam and, as far as it was possible (!), backed my answers with quotations from the Quran and the authentic Hadith to convince readers of the truth of my words." (Muhammad ibn Jamil Zinu. Islamic Akida - Belief, Conviction, Outlook - as Stated in the Holy Quran and the Authentic Sunnah. Moscow: Badr, 1998, p.4).

In fact, the great majority of works written by Wahhabi authors are based on the following principle. A postulate is stated followed by a quotation from the Quran or the Sunnah that proves the postulate. If the authors cannot find an appropriate quotation, they do without citing the Quran or the Sunnah.



Although this method produces the illusion that the stated postulates agree with the Quran and the Sunnah, it violates the traditional Islamic belief that the Quran and the Sunnah are recorded divine revelation. The goal of Islamic ulama (learned people) is to understand what Allah chose to impart upon people in the Quran and the Sunnah, given to the divine envoy Muhammad - and not to use quotations from the Holy Scripture as a confirmation of their own ideas. Moreover, even when quotations from the Quran or the Sunnah are used, the meaning of Wahhabi postulates often partially or completely diverges from what the quotations really imply.

The postulates of the Quran and Sunnah that don't agree with the ideas given in Wahhabi literature are just ignored as if they don't exist. As a result, Wahhabi teaching attributes great importance to the concept of infidelity, Jews and Christians being reckoned among the infidels (more about this later). But none of the translations of Wahhabi texts that ground the infidelity of Jews and Christians include the following quotation from the Quran: "Verily! Those who believe and those who are Jews and Christians, and Sabians, whoever believes in Allah and the Last Day and do righteous good deeds shall have their reward with their Lord, on them shall be no fear, nor shall they grieve" (The Quran, 2:62).



Here is one more example. Wahhabi teaching attributes great significance to jihad. No attention, however, is paid to the words of the Prophet about the greater and the lesser jihad. On return from the battle of Badr (year 624), in which Muslims defeated polytheists, Muhammad said, "We are finished with the lesser jihad; now we are starting the greater jihad." But these words are traditionally interpreted in Islam as follows: armed fight is the lesser jihad, whereas peaceful, constructive labor is the main, greater jihad.



Thus, Wahhabism is the result of the selection of a few applicable Islamic postulates. One who has set to analyze and evaluate this doctrine should, on the one hand, not regard the Islamic postulates not included in Wahhabi literature as Wahhabi, and on the other hand, keep oneself from referring to the ideas that are conveyed in Wahhabi texts as truly Islamic. For "Infidels" Are proclaiming strict monotheism, Wahhabis use the absolute meaning of the concepts of infidelity (Arab. kufr) and polytheism (Arab. shirk). This is the main postulate of Wahabism, and the followers of this teaching call themselves accordingly - monotheists. In the history of Islam as a monotheistic religion, within the framework of jurisprudence (fiqh), theology (kalam), philosophy (falsafah) and theoretical Sufism (tasawwuf), there developed a maximally complete and adequate understanding of the idea of monotheism, as it is described in the Quran and Sunnah. Wahabis, however, deny the possibility of theological and philosophical interpretation of the texts of the Quran and Sunnah. They define the idea of monotheism from the contrary, by defining what monotheism is not!. Consider, for example, the main Wahhabi book, The Book of Monotheism by Ibn Abd al-Wahhab, as well as contemporary Wahhabi writings (see S.W.Fawzan. The Book of Monotheism, Makhachkala, Badr, 1997; M.A.Bashamil. What We Understand by Monotheism, Makhachkala, Badr, 1997). Eight to nine tenths of these books deal with what polytheism is and what infidelity as a denial of monotheism or deviation from it is. So what, in the opinion of Wahhabis, is polytheism and infidelity, and who are polytheists and infidels?



Jews and Christians are regarded as infidels in Wahhabi literature (see Programs of Studying Sharia Sciences. A joint edition of the Saudi Arabia's Ministry for Islamic Affairs, Waqfs, Levy and Orientation, and the Russian Ibrahim Al-Ibrahim fund. Moscow, 1999. Section Hadiths and Terms). Ibn Abd al-Wahhab confirms this postulate in his Book of Monotheism by selected sayings of the prophet Muhammad: "When one of their (Jews & Christians') Righteous men or righteous slaves of Allah dies, they build a temple on his grave and draw his images inside it. These (i.e. Jews & Christians.) are the worst of Allah's creatures!"



"May Allah damn Jews and Christians, who turned the graves of their prophets into temples!" (Ibn Abd al-Wahhab. The Book of Monotheism). The infidelity and polytheism of Jews and Christians is the commonplace of Wahhabi writings. Jews and Christians are polytheists because they "chose the graves of their prophets to say their prayers on them" (Programs of Studying Sharia Sciences. Section Foundations of the Islamic Teaching). People who build temples on the graves of their holy men and decorate them with icons "are reckoned among the worst creatures in the face of Allah" (Programs of Studying Sharia Sciences. Section Hadiths and Terms).



Infidels are also the Muslims who, in the opinion of Wahhabis, deviated from “Wahabi understanding of” monotheism ("apostasy"). Actually, the whole Book of Monotheism by Ibn Abd al-Wahhab is devoted to such deviations. Among these are glorification of the righteous, worship of Allah at the graves of the righteous (wali), worship of deceased righteous men, worship of idols; sorcery, astrology and any kind of prediction, wearing of amulets or any other things that are believed to protect from harm, worship of monuments and statues, glorification of a certain person, and many other deeds and actions (see also: S.W.Fawsan, The Book of Monotheism; M.A.Bashamil, What We Understand by Monotheism). Infidels are also the Muslims who "introduce any innovations in religion" (Programs of Studying Sharia Sciences. Section Hadiths and Terms). Particularly, Sufis are rated among such infidels.



It is a trait inherent in Wahhabism to regard as infidels the Muslims who deviate from monotheism. Although they could never prove and claim with evidence that any Muslims deviated from  monotheism. According to Islamic tradition, the believer who performs what is considered infidelity by Wahhabis (like wearing an amulet, laying flowers to a monument, performing a ziyarat to the grave of the righteous-wali) remains a believer if this action is not a deviation from the symbol of Islamic faith - "There is no God but Allah; Muhammad is his messenger". Wahhabis, however, say that any deviation from their view of monotheism turns a Muslim into an infidel. Thus, he becomes an apostate, and the punishment for apostasy in Islam is death. So they pass Fatwa’s and kill Muslims!



Wahhabis assert that neither pronouncing the formula "There is no God but Allah; Muhammad is his messenger", which, in Islam, signifies conversion into a Muslim, nor strict adherence to postulates of Islam can guarantee that a Muslim who deviated from (wahabi type)monotheism by act of "infidelity" will remain a Muslim (see Ibn Abd al-Wahhab. The Book of Monotheism). Moreover, Wahhabis declare that a Muslim ceases to be a Muslim if he deviates from (wahabi type)monotheism even in the least degree. In this case, his life and property are no longer immune; therefore he may be killed and deprived of his property. "Pronouncement alone does not ensure immunity of life and property, nor does the understanding of the meaning of the evidence ("There is no God but Allah; Muhammad is his messenger." - A.I.), nor the pronouncing and acknowledgement of it, nor appealing in namazes (prayers. - A.I.) to the one and only Allah, who has no companions. The property and life of a man are immune only when everything mentioned above is complemented by a complete rejection of all objects of worship except Allah (by the way, No Muslim ever worships anything besides Almighty Allah, it is only a baseless unproven allegation of Wahabis). Any doubt or hesitation deprives a man of immunity of his property and his life" (Ibn Abd al-Wahhab. The Book of Monotheism).

The so-called "hypocrites" constitute a separate group of infidels. A hypocrite is a Muslim who "demonstrates adherence to Islam and conceals his infidelity" (Programs of Studying Sharia Sciences. Section Foundations of the Islamic Teaching). In other words, Wahhabis can proclaim any Muslim a hypocrite and infidel. "…The one who deviates (from their form of monotheism, as understood by Wahhabis), openly or secretly, must know that he becomes an infidel and expect a possibility of being killed or confined." (Ben Baz. The Necessity of Obeying the Sunnah of the Messenger of Allah and Declaring Those Who Repudiate It Infidels. Riyadh, Waquf Ministry's General Print Board, 2000).

Wahhabis also regard as infidels followers of all ideological movements without exception. Thus, "adherence to atheistic movements, such as communism, secularism, democracy, capitalism and other such movements of infidels is an apostasy from the Islamic religion (S.W.Fawsan. The Book of Monotheism). The list of these ideological movements also includes "Marxist socialism and atheistic masonry" (Zinu. Islamic Akida). Communism is, obviously, an infidelity as well. Naturally, no exception was made for "Judaism, which stands behind everyone and every destructive doctrine subversive of morality and spiritual values", to which also belong "masonry, world Zionism and babuism". I have no wish to guess what the last word ("babuism") means.

According to Wahhabis, infidelity is also implementation of any formula of socio-political organization that is not based completely and exceptionally on the Sharia, or Islamic rule, as Wahhabis understand it. Infidelity is "the ruling and judging not in accord with what Allah sent down" (S.W.Fawsan, The Book of Monotheism). Wahhabis regard any legislative human activity as infidelity. Infidelity is "any pretense on the right to ordain laws, to allow and to forbid." Wahhabis call infidel everyone who is involved in the system of social relations, providing for delegation of authority and redistribution of public resources, including exchange of values and services. A polytheist and infidel is also one "who makes appeals to a prophet, king, ruler or anyone else, or asks someone, besides Allah, for help…" (Ibn Abd al-Wahhab. The Book of Monotheism).

Predestined Salvation (The "Saved Group")

Wahhabis claim the Wahhabi movement to be totally impeccable where questions of monotheism are concerned, and usurp the right to judge and penalize "infidels", "polytheists" and "hypocrites." But one thing Wahhabis usually avoid discussing is who or what gave them the right, which in Islam belongs to God and no one else, to take a final judgment on whether a man is a true monotheist (especially in the cases of the so-called "concealed" or "secret" infidelity, i.e. "hypocrisy"), and enforce the penalty for infidelity (including death)? Nobody and nothing in Islam could give them such right.

Wahhabis, however, can't ignore this problem, as their Muslim adversaries always remind them of it. They try to solve this problem in three ways.

First, they allege that they follow true monotheism. They also call themselves Salafi, i.e. those who follow what the Prophet and the first three generations of Muslims followed. Apart from that, they call themselves the "saved group" - this is how one of the Prophet's Hadiths calls the group that will evade the infernal flame on Judgement Day (Zinu. Islamic Akida).

Secondly, to prove this, Wahhabis search out further evidence of their selectness. They claim that the "saved group" "presents a minority" in the umma - community of Muslims (Zinu. Islamic Akida). By the way, this statement proves the minority status of Wahhabis and the sectarian character of their movement.

Wahhabis claim the ethnic character of their movement as another supporting piece of evidence. And they specify what group comprises the true monotheists. In their opinion, these are Arabs. "Arabs are missionaries of Islam… Having brought Islam into life, they will become the best ones on Earth" (Zinu. Islamic Akida). This idea is not backed with a quotation from the Quran or Sunnah; Wahhabis wouldn't be able to do it. From the very beginning Islam was a supranational religion, denying supremacy of one national group over the other. Besides Arabs, initially among the "missionaries of Islam" were also Ethiopians, Persians, Jews, Berbers…

But it is important for Wahhabis to claim it in order to characterize more precisely the group that knows, even before Judgment Day, that it is the "saved" one. Wahhabis describe their own movement as Arabic.



Hate as a Religious Requirement

According to Wahhabis, only complete obedience to the Wahhabi group and active hostility (including killing) towards everyone who doesn't belong to it can prove the man to be a monotheist.

How can the man protect himself from being proclaimed an infidel and thus avoid punishment for his infidelity? There is only one way - he must reject every kind of infidelity and polytheism (see above) and, after repenting his infidelity, adhere to monotheism as Wahhabis understand it. But this cannot spare this man of accusations of hesitation, doubt and hypocrisy, i.e. concealed infidelity, so he can be subjected to takfir, which deprives his life and property of immunity, and be punished (maybe even killed).

If the man is a Muslim in the first place, the decisive argument for his faithfulness to Allah, or the condition by which he can avoid being proclaimed an infidel, is his loyalty to Wahhabis and hostility to every non-Wahhabi. "The only way it can be achieved is by love to those who practice tauhid of Allah (i.e. to monotheists; this is how Wahhabis call themselves. - A.I.), devotion to them, rendering them every kind of help, as well as by hate and hostility to infidels and mushriks (polytheists. - A.I.)". (Ibn Abd al-Wahhab, The Book of Monotheism.)

What marks a member of Wahhabi group is a number of characteristics: particular appearance (men, for example, shave mustaches and don't shave beards) and particular clothes (short trousers, cut up the ankle, etc.). Remarkably enough, even here Wahhabis act from the contrary, implementing the principle of "inadmissibility of the imitation of infidels" (Programs of Studying Sharia Sciences. Section Hadiths and Terms).

But the most important characteristic is that the Muslim who adopts Wahhabism must confirm his monotheism by "hate and hostility." The true monotheist, according to Wahhabis, must hate all those whom Wahhabis regard as infidels, polytheists, and hypocrites. Hate, however, is an emotion that is not easy to control. Wahhabis pay special attention to visible behavior of the man. Visible manifestation of hate is what can preserve the Muslim from accusations in infidelity; otherwise his life and property are deprived of immunity. This hate must be always openly manifested as hostility to infidels. In order to be a Muslim, the man must "be hostile to polytheists and infidels. There are so many Muslims who are pure and free from paganism (polytheism) but are not hostile to pagans (polytheists)! In this case the man can't be a Muslim… Every true Muslim must be hostile to pagans and hate them". It is forbidden to have any positive attitude to infidels and do them any good. "Friendliness to infidels and rendering them help are not allowed."

The main Wahhabi punishment for infidelity is death. If the man doesn't obey the Sharia, as understood by Wahhabis, he becomes an infidel. According to Wahhabis, "The Most High said, "The one who let it be like this is an infidel, who should be killed," if he doesn't get back to the Law of Allah and His Messenger" (M.A.-L. Ibrahim. Instituting the Laws of Allah. Makhachkala, Badr, 1997). The killing of infidels according to Wahhabi doctrine must be systematic and orderly, in the form of jihad against infidels.

Armed Struggle Is the Main Form of Jihad as Understood by Wahhabis

According to Wahhabis, jihad as an armed struggle is required for the purpose of spreading their teaching. Jihad is a war against infidels, polytheists and hypocrites. Wahhabis specify various kinds of jihad. Here is an example: "There are four kinds of jihad. 1. Jihad against shaitan. 2. Jihad against the soul. 3. Jihad against infidels. 4. Jihad against hypocrites". However, Wahhabi books that were translated don't specify "jihad against shaitan" and jihad against the soul". All Wahhabi postulates concerning jihad relate to jihad against infidels, polytheists and hypocrites, or rather against those whom Wahhabis call so.

Jihad is defined as an "armed struggle from the position of Islam" (Programs of Studying Sharia Sciences. Section Life of the Prophet), "an armed way of defending the interests of Allah" (Bin Baaz. The Necessity of Obeying the Sunnah of the Messenger of Allah…). Since Wahhabis understand jihad as an armed struggle, it becomes clear why their texts lack postulates concerning, for example, "jihad against the soul" (that is, moral self-improvement). Arguments for an "armed struggle" of the man against his own vices would look strange.

For Wahhabis, jihad is obligatory. "Jihad is the ultimate manifestation of Islam, as the Messenger said (the words attributed to the Prophet Muhammad are not cited, however. - A.I.). It is a furnace in which Muslims are melted out and which allows the separation of the bad [Muslim] from the good one. It is also a pass to the Eden," and "the Eden is in the shade of swords" (Programs of Studying Sharia Sciences. Section Life of the Prophet). It would be appropriate to note (however obvious it is) that an "armed struggle" means the use of arms with the purpose to kill the enemy. "Muslims come victorious out of an armed struggle in both cases, whether they killed or were killed."

The aims of jihad as an armed struggle are the following (the order of the items varies in Wahhabi literature). Firstly, the aim of jihad is to lead an armed struggle against everyone who hinders the spreading of Wahhabi teaching and its exclusive predominance. "1. An armed struggle for the sake of raising the word of Allah above everything and devoting the whole religion to Allah only" (Programs of Studying Sharia Sciences. Section Life of the Prophet). Or, in other words, "2. Removal of all obstacles to the spreading of the call to Allah. 3. Protection of religious doctrines and Islamic akida of any threats overhanging them" (Zinu. Islamic Akida).

Secondly, the aim of Wahhabi jihad, understood as an armed struggle, is a fight against all infidels, polytheists and hypocrites: "1. A struggle against paganism and pagans, as Allah strictly forbids attaching anyone else to Him" (Zinu. Islamic Akida). "5. An armed struggle against hypocrites" (Programs of Studying Sharia Sciences. Section Life of the Prophet). Infidels, however, can escape killing if they adopt Islam and recognize the authority of Wahhabis. "When the leader of Muslims meets infidels, he urges them to adopt Islam. If they refuse, they must pay capitation, otherwise an armed struggle follows" (Programs of Studying Sharia Sciences. Section Life of the Prophet). But, strictly speaking, this will not save them from death. Wahhabis can accuse these people of hypocrisy at any moment.

And finally, the third aim of jihad as an armed struggle is: "4. Protection of Muslims and their native land" (Zinu. Islamic Akida). The important point is that Wahhabis call to arms to protect Islam, Muslims and their native land against the potential enemy as well, i.e. against those whose intents can be regarded as hostile. "2. Armed struggle against the enemy, fighting or intending to fight with Muslims" (Programs of Studying Sharia Sciences. Section Life of the Prophet).

If Wahhabism had remained inside Saudi Arabia, I think there would be no serious problems. But in the early 1970's, Wahhabis began deliberately and actively spreading their principles outside the peninsula. Meanwhile, the United States, while trying to find a counterbalance to the Soviet Union and communism in the countries of Near and Middle East during the Cold War, actively encouraged Wahhabi pervasion into different countries. Over a period of three decades, Wahhabism spread in three directions:

70's - early 80's - Arabic countries (Egypt, Syria, Algeria and other regions of the Middle East).

80's - Afghanistan.

90's - the territory of the former Soviet Union (Russia, Central Asia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, etc.), South East Asia (including Sri Lanka), Western Europe, both Americas, Australia, Africa.

Wahhabism first began to manifest as an ideology among antigovernment extremist groups in Arabic countries during the 70's and 80's. Thus, Islamic extremism in the form of terrorist groups and illegal armed formations in Egypt, Algeria and other Arabic countries took form as a result of Wahhabi pervasion into the Muslim environment of these states.

The logic of Wahhabi takfir and jihad fully manifested itself in Algeria (however complex and contradictory were the events of the civil war, which claimed 100 thousand lives and ultimately destroyed the society and the state). According to the fundamentalist ideas of Algerian Wahhabi groups, all rulers who deviated from Islam were subject to death, as were all those who executed their rulers' orders. Nor did Wahhabi doctrine spare those who merely made no resistance to such rulers, nor those who did not agree with Wahhabis. Naturally, they didn't call themselves Wahhabis, but instead rather referred to themselves as Salafi Jamath.

Ultimately, a complex network of Wahhabi groups, outposts, footholds, training camps, educational institutions and coordinating centers had been created worldwide. There is hardly a country in the world today that is not a host (whether it knows this or not) to one of this network's cells - consider Saudi Arabia, Afghanistan, Great Britain, Algeria, Germany, Nigeria, Switzerland, the United States, Palestine, Uruguay, the Philippines...

Wahhabism also became the main ideology of the Arabic task groups during the war in Afghanistan, in which they fought not only against the Soviet "infidels" but also against Afghan Muslims, who were proclaimed "infidels" as well. Today, Wahhabism is also rampant among the so-called "Afghans of the second generation" - extremists of various nationalities currently being trained in Wahhabi camps on the territory of Afghanistan controlled by the Taliban, an ally of the Wahhabi movement. The new "Arabic Afghans" have spread around the world.

In the 90's Wahhabis launched a series of attacks against Russia, a nation that, the Wahhabis felt, kept Chechnya from becoming an Islamic state. The most dramatic manifestation of armed Wahhabi aggression was the invasion of Dagestan by Chechen and Arabic Wahhabis from the territory of Chechnya in 1999. Prior to this, they had invaded Chechnya - officially Russian territory - and committed a massacre in the Yarysh-Mardy ravine in April 1995. Before this, there were also fights between the newly converted Dagestan Wahhabis and traditionalist Muslims in Chabanmakhi (May 1997).

The spreading of Wahhabism, judging from the experience of its 30-year worldwide expansion, has always had negative results, as far as social stability and national security are concerned. These results include:

- split in the Muslim society of the affected country;

- conversion of a part of the nation's Muslim society (however small it might be) into an active anti-social or anti-government group or groups;

- spreading of the ideology of national intolerance and hostility, discrimination and segregation in the areas where Wahhabism has managed to take footing;

- theoretical justification of violence, extremism and terrorism in respect to those who are proclaimed "infidels;"

- active armed struggle or performance of terrorist acts against "infidels."

According to judicial inquiry and court proceedings, 1999's acts of terrorism in Moscow (where a block of residential buildings exploded), Buinaksk and Volgodonsk were performed by Wahhabi extremist groups. While in Chechnya Wahhabis kill imams, sheikhs and any Muslims who don't accept Wahhabism, many Russian towns were also swept by a wave of Wahhabi terror. Behind every act of violence, every incident in which weapons are involved, and every terrorist act, there are particular purposes and motives. It is the Wahhabi preaching of jihad, understood as obligatory armed fighting against "infidels," whom Wahhabis call "the worst of Allah's creatures" and whom "Allah hates," that has lifted the common Islamic ban on killing innocents.

Western civilization hasn't fully understood what has happened. The historic challenge that humankind has had to face in the last quarter of the previous century was interpreted as a clash of civilizations. From the point view of liberal humanism, the enemy was regarded as an equal (a civilization was thought to come into collision with another civilization). Moreover, Wahhabi teaching and Wahhabi ways were incorrectly interpreted as a manifestation of Islam by westerns with vested interests and crusaders justifying their invasions.

But to put it realistically, world civilization (including its important Islamic constituent) has collided with barbarity. It has clashed with a new totalitarianism, which is trying to bring down all humankind - whether in Kabul and Grozny, New York and Moscow, Jerusalem and Djakarta, Algiers and Paris, Beruwala and Eastern province, Mumbai and Chennai, Jakarta and Sumatra, Kuala Lumpur and Penang, Southern Thailand, Western China, Somalia, etc,etc. - and rule over people in accordance with the principles developed to suit only the aims of the 18th-century Arabic tribal aristocracy.